A survey of anaesthetic critical events based on voluntary anonymous reports was undertaken over a two and a half year period within a teaching hospital Department of Anaesthesia. Atthe end of the survey 167 reports were analysed. Human error was a contributing factor in 82% of events. Inadequate preoperative patient assessment or preparation, problems in the area of human/ equipment interface and various stress factors for the anaesthetist featured significantly in the survey. The method enables the collection of objective data on factors contributing to anaesthetic and surgical risk and the formulation and evaluation of potential corrective strategies. It also facilitates harmonious peer review via individual and group feedback activities. The adoption of such a survey on a wider scale is seen as a valuable part of quality assurance in the continuing attempt to increase patient safety.
Since its early adoption in the field of aviation 1 and from the work of Cooper et al., 2.3 the collection of data on 'critical incidents' is gaining acceptance in anaesthesia. The Anaesthetic Critical Event Survey (ACES) reported here is complementary to this and other pioneering studies in Australia. 4 The advantages of being able to identify potential risks to patients without having to wait for resulting morbidity, of collecting on-going, reliable, non-anecdotal data, of responding to perceived needs within a department or practice, have all aroused interest in such activities. It is a potentially powerful tool in a quality assurance program. 5 Most of the critical events are multifactorial. Many of them evolve over a varying period of time to produce a cascade of events, with the primary event or cause at the beginning and the outcome at the end. At some point in this cascade of events, an untoward occurrence is noted (e.g. cyanosis, tachycardia, alarm signal, disconnection noted), and thereafter a system of responses is initiated, some or all of which may be appropriate. Because of this, there may be widely differing views as to which particular event constitutes the 'critical incident' itself, and thus in which phase of the anaesthetic it occurred. Consider the following simple example: the failure to notice that the vaporiser is nearly empty at the start of a case, during the course of which it becomes totally depleted. Should we call this 'failure to check equipment' prior to induction, or an 'underdosage', or an 'arrhythmia + hypertension', or an 'awareness' reported in the post-recovery stage, or something else?
The one common point in all these reports is that at some stage there has been a perception that all is not as it should be and that the anaesthetist has become aware of a possible or actual threat to patient safety. For the sake of uniformity of reporting, this is deemed to be the point at which the 'critical event' occurred. All events before and after this point are factors contributing to the cause and outcome respectively.
As diverse as the reports themselves are the attitudes of reporters, each with his/her viewpoint on what to report and how to report. Despite studies showing a large contribution of human error in every field of human activity, most of us feel uncomfortable reporting our own failings. 6 The human/ equipment interface in anaesthesia is assuming increasing importance? but is insufficiently understood. Data from 'field studies' such as ACES should enable anaesthetists to participate more fully in the design and modification of their practice protocols and equipment in particular, and their working environment in general.
The ideal reporting and data collecting system should combine simplicity, clarity and uniformity of response. It should be broadly balanced in scope and yet be flexible enough to be able to elicit specific information without prejudging responses. 8 The ACES method is only one of several different attempts to approximate to this ideal. It is important to be aware of the limitations of any of these methods when evaluating the results so obtained. One can only review the data actually reported. A good quality assurance program should include other methods of evaluating potential problem areas in more depth. Other considerations such as reporting rate, confidentiality and medico-Iegal implications are not insurmountable problems when addressed in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The methodology for the study was devised and modified during an eighteen-month pilot study conducted during 1983 and 1984. 9 The blank ACES forms were left at the theatre suites of two sister teaching hospitals where they could be conveniently collected and filled in as soon as possible after the occurrence of a 'critical event'. The definition of a 'critical event' was any untoward and preventable mishap which was associated with the administration of general or regional anaesthesia, which led, or could have led, to an undesirable patient outcome. Colleagues who were actually involved were asked to report all such events by anonymously filling out a form and also providing a brief narrative outline on the reverse side. In the interests of confidentiality, identification of the anaesthetist, patient, exact surgical procedure or date was not required. Completed forms were then put into locked collection boxes.
Every few weeks the most recently reported events were discussed at an open departmental meeting held for this purpose. Further details were often freely contributed by respondents at those review meetings, and the views of colleagues on suggested corrective strategies were sought. Members of the department also took the opportunity to voice any relevant concerns which arose from discussion of any event.
Following the meetings, a written feedback report was prepared, giving a brief outline of reports received and comments arising from discussion of each event. A copy of this was sent to all departmental members, thereby achieving individual as well as group feedback, irrespective of attendance at the review meetings. Table 1 contains a representative extract from feedback reports containing de-identified events and comments. Each respondent was able to identify his own contribution by means of a unique number appearing at the top righthand corner of every blank ACES form. In addition, a general overview of the recent reports was circulated in the monthly departmental informal magazine 'COMA', together with any hazard alerts as necessary. Finally, a summary of the meeting, general breakdown of types of events and any recommendations on departmental policy changes, equipment review and related topics was sent to the departmental director for comment and/or action. Contrary to the expectation of some clinicians, all these activities were generally well received, in a spirit of co-operation among senior and junior colleagues, nursing and technical staff alike.
As with the pilot study, response rate tended to fall with time and it was constantly necessary to remind colleagues to report recent events. The pressure of time, a heavy 
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Patient with unsuspected subglottic stricture eventually intubated with 6.5 mm ETT. Previous GA record not fully examined preoperatively wherein similar difficulties had been noted (not prominently) and patient unaware of previous problems. Verbal and written communication is the important responsibility of the anaesthetist in situations like this, both with the patient and colleagues. Do we need hazard alert stickers for anaesthesia in patient notes?
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During maintenance of routine relaxant anaesthetic, pulse oximeter showed sudden progressive fall in Sao2 to 85%. Airway peak pressure had fallen by 5 cm H 2 0 but no other change and no alarm triggered. Hand ventilation revealed crack had developed in Bird humidifier connector at temperature probe site. Tubing changed and no sequelae. N.B. The unexpected can always happen but pulse oximeter detected problem early. Shows the value of properly set low-pressure (as opposed to 'disconnect') alarms for detection of small leaks in circuitry.
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RMO performed intubation in paediatric patient. T -piece attached, which pulled out ETT before it was strapped in place. Sao2 fell to 70% during reintubation but no sequelae. Inadequate supervision of junior staff.
workload and an abundance of other paperwork all reduce the reporting rate, even from the most motivated anaesthetists. Compliance rates in this type of voluntary survey tend to vary in direct proportion to the effort continually put into collecting the data. A non-threatening atmosphere is essential for reporting human error in particular. The reports were classified by the author into 'routine' and 'non-routine' according to whether they had been scheduled on a normal operating list or not (i.e. late additions or extra cases). This classification was irrespective of the time of day or the degree of surgical emergency. The purpose of this was to find out whether the lack of normal preoperative review by the usual person would be of significance.
Throughout the analysis of data for this report, the narratives were constantly re-examined to ensure maximum reliability of reported data. Whenever an 'error of judgement', 'fault of technique' or 'failure to check equipment' was reported, the narrative was examined to determine the impact of human error in the event. In all these reports the presence of human error was a significant factor. A check was made to ensure that no reports involving 'stress' or 'syringe swap' were excluded by this method of determining the presence of human error. The study was terminated in its 'ACES' format in June 1988, when this institution joined in the Australasian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS). One hundred and sixty-seven valid reports were subsequently analysed for the period from January 1986 to June 1988. Figure 1 . The number of responses in each category for the entire survey is shown beside each box. Figure 2 shows an overview of event frequency. These events are not separate entities but overlap each other considerably. The high incidence of inadequate patient assessment, for example, is associated with many 'stress' factors and, in turn, this contributes to the prevalence of pharmacological events. Human error contributes to the majority of events.
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SURVEY vs HOSPITAL DATA

RESULTS
A sample of the ACES form is shown in
Comparative data from the survey and from the hospital in general are shown in Figures 3 and 4. 'Hospital data' was obtained from independent, routine surveys compiled from both hospitals' operating theatre records during the survey period. There seems to be an increased risk associated with major rather than minor procedures ( Figure 3 ) and with general as compared with regional anaesthesia (Figure 4 ). Except for two areas (see below) the results do not indicate any increased risk associated with non-routine cases. There may be slightly higher risk for paediatric patients (0-14 years) but no detailed age breakdown of patients was possible.
There was no correlation between the experience level of the reporting anaesthetist and any specific type of event. It would seem that the same types of mishaps may occur at any level of experience.
From Figure 5 it can be seen that induction and maintenance are equally hazardous times. There may be some underreporting of recovery incidents due to the lack of anaesthetic staff on duty in the recovery areas.
Airway and circuitry events were numerous and 63% of the reported airway events involved a period of non-ventilation of the patient. The major airway and circuitry factors contributing to non-ventilation are summarised in Table 2 . It is interesting to note that, contrary to several other reports,3,5,10 disconnection is not the most frequent event reported in this category. Total incidence of reported stress factors was 34.7%. Table 3 shows that half of these involved inadequate communication and half undue haste. Over 30% of reported stress involved two or more stress factors. If 'stress' were reported, it was more likely to be a nonroutine case, especially so if fatigue and inadequate assistance were a feature.
Stress
There were fifty-six reports involving a 'failure of supervision' (see Figure 1 ). Of these, nearly half were 'failure of supervision of a junior colleague'.
A quarter of the reports involved inadequate preoperative patient assessment or preparation. These reports were associated with a higher than usual incidence of stress and non-routine cases ( Table 4 ).
Another prominent feature was the number of pharmacological events (38%). Half of these involved under or overdosage in equal proportions, and a large incidence of inappropriate drug. Only 12% involved the syringe swap type ( Figure 6 ). The ACES definition of 'syringe swap' type incidents includes any case of mistaken identity of an administered substance and includes gases, vapours and infusions. There were only ten instances where the presence of relieving staff was a factor, but in nine of these, it was considered to have precipitated the event. This is contrary to the findings in another study9 and may indicate a need for adequate handover protocols.
Outcome is summarised in Figure 7 . Over 90% of outcomes were reported as nil or transient with only two outcomes unknown. Major sequelae are summarised in Table 5 .
Over two-thirds of events involved some problem related to equipment and its usage ( Figure 2) . Reports in which the presence or lack of monitoring equipment was a factor are summarised in Table 6 . Note that nine events were detected early by the use of monitors, a further twelve could have been but were not, and six events implicated monitoring equipment as the cause. In only four of these was the monitoring equipment itself faulty and in two, the monitors were not checked preoperatively.
The total incidence of human error as a factor was 82% and this agrees with other studies.1.6.11.l2 Table 7 shows a breakdown of the types of human error reported.
Finally, fifty events reported early in the study were compared on a number of points with fifty taken from near the end of the survey period, to look for changes in pattern of events reported (Figure 8 ). No major difference was found in prevalence of human error, grade of reporting anaesthetist or nonroutine cases. There was a drop in the incidence of pharmacological events from 42% to 26%, a rise in the incidence of equipment problems from 68% to 76%, and a doubling of the incidence of failure to check equipment from 16% to 34%. During the study period seven review meetings were held, from which seven feedback reports were compiled and distributed.
A total of seven recommendations were made regarding equipment, training and rostering, of which six have been, or are in the process of being, implemented.
Following the final analysis of data, a questionnaire on pre-anaesthetic equipment checking routines and intra-and interdepartmental communication problems was circulated to all colleagues. Response rate was 52% and these are currently being analysed with a view to formulating and evaluating specific corrective strategies in these areas. DISCUSSION A general overview of the data obtained would seem to indicate no bias of critical events towards emergency, out-of-hours cases or trainee anaesthetists. A large proportion of events occur during routine general anaesthetics for major surgical procedures.
There is a constant high incidence of human error, and an increase in equipment problems, notably user error and failure to check equipment adequately.
Anaesthetists are becoming more aware of the need to focus attention on postoperative and recovery room monitoring, 13, 14 and as this area of study intensifies, perhaps a more accurate picture of the incidence of recovery period events will emerge. However, induction and maintenance would seem to be the periods of greatest patient risk.
Airway events still figure prominently, but perhaps unrecognised disconnections are slowly declining in number with the increased use of automatically activated disconnect and low pressure circuit alarms in the hospitals surveyed. The impact of other devices such as capnography and pulse oximetry in this area may emerge from later studies such as AIMS.
Pharmacological events, notably inappropriate dosages and the use of an inappropriate drug, may relate to the incidence of inadequate preoperative assessment of patients and the high incidence of communication problems and haste. This deserves further study. Syringe or ampoule swap type events are not common in comparison, but the study did not seek information on drug labelling practices.
Communication difficulties occurred in many events. Good communication between anaesthetists and other staff is important and is being addressed. This is especially so in large institutions, where the same anaesthetists and surgeons do not work together on a regular basis.
'Failure of supervision of ajunior colleague' was equally represented in the pharmacological and decision-making tasks and in the equipment and technique-related problems.
What this survey may reveal is the need to attend to the area of human/equipment interface. With increasing changes in the amount and type of equipment, anaesthetists must have a better informed and constructive input into its development, design and use.
Having obtained such information, there Although objective evidence of the 'effectiveness' of such studies is still elusive, Figure 8 illustrates a crude method of estimating it. On a relatively small scale such as this study, it may only give an approximation of reporting trends. However, it has been useful to highlight possible problem areas which have been subjected to further study within our wider Quality Assurance Program.
The Australasian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) addresses this area more directly. It includes 'Factors minimising the severity of the incident' and 'Suggested corrective strategies' within the reporting form itself. Information on AIMS can be obtained from the Australian Patient Safety Foundation, G.P.O. Box 400, Adelaide, South Australia 5001.
This study is a sample of critical events as they have been occurring in a large department of anaesthesia. Since it only includes that which motivated colleagues have freely chosen to reveal, it is almost certainly just the tip of the iceberg. Regardless of whether it is a completely representative sample of what is actually happening, the alerts, recommendations and further studies arising from it have already shown it to be worthy of note.
Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. J 7, No. 4, November, 1989 ACES is seen as an early attempt to gather the sort of information anaesthetists and (arguably) other procedural specialists require in order to evaluate their practice and equipment effectively. As more trainees become exposed to this type of program, there may be more anaesthetists and surgeons in the future who will regard it as a normal and necessary part of their quality assurance activities. With increasing participation and improvements in design, it is hoped that the volume and reliability of data so obtained will help to further reduce patient risk associated with anaesthesia and surgery in this country.
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